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Executive Summary
Key findings and recommendations
This report uses Covid-19 health status certificates as an all-encompassing 
term, referring to the digital and paper-based certificates that, combined with 
identity verification, allow individuals to prove their health status (such as the 
results of Covid-19 tests and vaccination records).
It follows from the research that three main barriers to the successful 
implementation of Covid-19 health status certificates can be identified:  
1. Lack of trust
2. Lack of global standards 
3. Lack of a holistic approach
The research findings suggest that three key sets of measures have the 
potential to contribute to the responsible implementation of Covid-19 
certificates:  
1. Inclusion of sunset clauses in legislation 
2. Appropriate governance of health data 
3. Proactive protection of data privacy
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Accordingly, it is recommended that:
1.  Policymakers should ensure the availability and affordability of Covid-19 tests 
and vaccines to the whole population to avoid creating a two-tiered society 
in which only the wealthy have access to mobility and services.  
2.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificates are 
only used during the pandemic and that their use is discontinued once the 
WHO declares that Covid-19 is no longer a public health emergency of 
international concern.
3.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificate providers, 
whether from the private or public sector, abide by the basic data protection 
principles, including lawfulness, fairness and transparency, purpose limitation, 
data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality, 
and accountability.
4.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificate providers 
build data protection into the design of these certificates by default, thus 
contributing towards mitigating known risks to data privacy. 
5.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificate providers 
maintain the confidentiality and security of the information collected and 
processed. They should prevent any unauthorised access, accidental loss, 
damage or destruction of the data.  
6.  Policymakers should request that Covid-19 health status certificate providers 
undertake data protection impact assessments (DPIA) before implementing 
specific solutions. That is important as these certificates are likely to result in 
a high risk to natural persons’ rights and freedoms.  
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The Covid-19 pandemic has imposed a significant toll on countries around the world. In addition to 
the dramatic increase in population mortality and the substantially adverse health effects for many 
individuals, the pandemic has also shown the limits of public health policies. 
Solutions based on technology abounded – mainly geared to help solve the problems caused by the 
pandemic, with various degrees of success. Contact-tracing applications and Covid-19 health status 
certificates were among those technologies aiming to support public health measures while providing 
individuals with a promise of returning to normalcy.
This report focuses on Covid-19 health status certificates, also commonly referred to as vaccine 
passports or digital health passports. It presents independent research funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) as part of UK Research & Innovation (UKRI)’s rapid response to 
Covid-19. 
The report builds on research findings based on disciplinary and interdisciplinary literature reviews 
and evaluations of primary and secondary sources of law. The research was also informed by 
twenty semi-structured interviews with technologists and experts in digital identity and certification 
conducted between December 2020 and March 2021. The study also benefited from the insights 
and views of experts who participated in two workshops in March 2021 and May 2021. 
While the report does not refer to individual contributions by each of the experts, a list of those 
who were interviewed and participated in the workshops is available in annexes 1 and 2. 
Using socio-legal methodology (Cownie & Bradney, 2017), the research situated the law within the 
broader context of using technology and health data in public health emergencies. The socio-legal 
approach was used to uncover the “law in context” (as opposed to doctrinal or black-letter law 
research), to investigate the limits and necessary safeguards imposed by courts when States restrict 
individuals’ human rights.
The report aims to inform decision-makers about (1) the key barriers to the implementation of 
Covid-19 health status certificates; (2) the potential implementation enablers, and (3) the risks these 
certificates pose to the protection of data privacy and human rights as well as the potential avenues 
for risk mitigation. 
Introduction and methodology
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A variety of terms has been used to describe the tools allowing an individual to prove their 
Covid-19 health status – “digital health passports”, “vaccine passports”, “green passes”, 
or “immunity passports”. While the term passport has been used liberally, notably in the 
media, these certificates do not refer to passports in the sense of official documents issued 
by governments as proof of one’s nationality or citizenship. 
This report uses Covid-19 health status certificates as an all-encompassing term, referring 
to the digital and paper-based certificates that, combined with identity verification,  
allow individuals to prove their health status (such as the results of Covid-19 tests and 
vaccination records).
Clarifying the terminology
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At the time of writing, the World Health Organization (WHO) had advised against governments 
requiring proof of Covid-19 vaccination for international travel due to the uncertainties about 
whether the vaccines prevent disease transmission (WHO, 2021a). Much is still unknown, despite 
the scientific community’s efforts in evaluating the risk of SARS-CoV-2 reinfection, immunity, and 
immunisation (Phelan, 2020; Boyton & Altmann, 2021; Mills & Dye, 2021; Ada Lovelace Institute, 
2021b; Ada Lovelace Institute, 2021d). 
The WHO launched (in December 2020) and later dissolved (in June 2021) a Smart Vaccination 
Certificate Working Group. The group had the task to review the possibility of adopting a Smart 
Vaccination Certificate for Covid-19 (WHO, 2020, 2021b). The decision to dissolve the working 
group reflected a change in scope for the WHO – the institution announced that it would develop 
guidance to include SARS-CoV-2 testing and Covid-19 recovery status in addition to Covid-19 
vaccination. Three separate documents will reportedly guide States, focusing on the technical aspects 
of the rebranded Digital Documentation of Covid-19 Certificates (DDCC) (WHO, 2021b). 
There is a growing consensus about requiring Covid-19 health status certificates for international 
travel. In England, since 17 May 2021, those persons who have received a full course of the Covid-19 
vaccine can use the NHS digital application to demonstrate their vaccination status when travelling 
abroad (Department of Health and Social Care, 2021). 
In all Member States of the European Union (EU), the EU Digital Covid Certificates (formerly 
labelled Digital Green Certificates) have been fully operational since 1 July 2021 (European 
Commission, 2021a). These digital and paper-based certificates are primarily used for international 
travel within the EU. They contain a QR code and a digital signature for enhanced security. 
The European Economic Area (EEA) countries (Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway) and Switzerland 
have also implemented Covid-19 health status certificates that can be connected to the EU Digital 
Covid Certificate Gateway (European Commission, 2021a).
State of play
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However, the lack of a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) for the EU Digital Covid 
Certificates has cast significant doubts on the level of protection of health data (European  
Data Protection Board and European Data Protection Supervisor, 2021, para. 16).
The private sector has also proposed a variety of Covid-19 health status certificates, often based  
on smartphone applications and mostly focusing on international travel (CommonPass, 2021;  
Good Health Pass, 2021; IATA, 2021; IBM, 2021).
The domestic uses of Covid-19 health status certificates are not straightforward. While the UK 
government has decided not to mandate Covid-19 status certification (HM Government, 2021, para. 
4), domestic uses of Covid-19 certificates are being considered by the government in England. Such 
certificates would notably be required for access to nightclubs and crowded venues (Stewart, 2021). 
A number of other countries worldwide have introduced Covid-19 health status certificates for use 
in domestic settings. These include, for example, Israel, France, Italy and Switzerland, (Ada Lovelace 
Institute, 2021a).
Risks of increased surveillance, scope creep, inequality and discrimination have been repeatedly 
voiced by academics and civil society organisations (Kofler & Baylis, 2020; Phelan, 2020; Privacy 
International, 2020; Beduschi, 2020a, 2020b; Ada Lovelace Institute, 2021b; Mills & Dye, 2021).
On this basis, the present report takes stock of these different initiatives and provides a 
comprehensive analysis of their main barriers to implementation, potential enablers and their 
implications for data privacy and human rights. 
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It follows from the research that three main barriers to the successful implementation 
of Covid-19 health status certificates can be identified: (1) lack of trust; (2) lack of global 
standards; and (3) lack of a holistic approach.
Lack of trust
A lack of trust in digital solutions proposed so far for the management of the Covid-19 has been 
consistently highlighted as a significant issue by populations worldwide (Blasimme & Vayena, 2020; 
Ipsos MORI, 2020). Contact-tracing applications were of particular concern (Akinbi, Forshaw, & 
Blinkhorn, 2021). 
Contact-tracing applications have indeed been misused in certain countries. For instance, reportedly, 
in Singapore, data from the contact-tracing applications were shared with the police even though 
the government had initially ensured that the data would only be used for the limited purpose of 
managing the pandemic (Illmer, 2021).
Similarly, concerns about whether Covid-19 health status certificates would be re-purposed for 
further uses (Pietropaoli, 2021), such as serving as a de facto digital identity system, have been voiced 
by experts and activists worldwide (Privacy International, 2020; Edwards, 2021). 
While there seems to be broad support for Covid-19 health status certificates worldwide, significant 
trust issues remain, notably regarding access and management of health data. 
In the UK, where debates about digital identity are still ongoing, a survey found that Britons strongly 
supported the introduction of vaccine certificates for international travel (Ipsos MORI, 2021a). 
Another survey by Ipsos MORI for the World Economic Forum showed that about three in four 
adults across 28 countries supported the idea of requiring vaccine certificates for international travel 
and for attending large public events (Ipsos MORI, 2021b). 
However, this global survey also found that only 50% of individuals were comfortable allowing their 
governments to access their personal health data, and just 40% in the case of private companies 
(Ipsos MORI, 2021b). 
Key barriers to implementation
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Lack of global standards
The lack of global standards for Covid-19 health status certificates was also identified as an 
important barrier to successful implementation. Ten out of twenty experts interviewed for 
this project mentioned a need for widely accepted standards for Covid-19 certificates. Experts 
participating in the project’s workshops also pointed out that policymakers must learn from previous 
experiences implementing digital identity solutions – the lack of universal standards was a significant 
problem already back then. The experts have also highlighted the difficulties in achieving truly global 
standards in this area due to time constraints.
Yet, since June 2021, the EU has progressed in establishing a common framework and setting up EU 
Digital Covid Certificates standards. The European Commission has issued technical specifications 
and developed reference software and applications for issuing, storing, and verifying certificates 
(European Commission, 2021b). 
An EU Digital Covid Certificate Gateway was set up and was already operational in June 2021. 
The gateway is hosted at the European Commission’s data centre in Luxembourg. This digital 
infrastructure connects national databases holding the public signature keys contained in the QR 
codes of each certificate (vaccine records, Covid-19 test results, or recovery certificates). Its goal is 
to allow the verification of these digital signatures without processing personal data – as the personal 
information of the certificate holder does not go through the gateway but is stored at the national 
level (European Commission, 2021a). 
Further research will be needed to evaluate the uptake of the EU Digital Covid Certificates by 
individuals at the EU level and the impact these certificates will have on creating global standards in 
the context of international travel outside of the EU. 
In this regard, the Council of the EU recommended that if the Commission is satisfied that 
certificates issued by a third country comply with the EU standards and are interoperable, it may 
adopt a decision allowing these certificates to be accepted in the EU (Council Recommendation (EU) 
2021/816, para. 11). The same conditions as those applicable to the EU Digital Covid Certificates 
would then apply. For example, as a baseline, the vaccines authorised in the EU are to be accepted. 
However, individual member States can also decide to accept those vaccines approved by the WHO 
(Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/816, para. 12). 
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Lack of a holistic approach
Our research findings clearly indicate that focusing only on the technological solutions for 
Covid-19 health status certificates is not sufficient. As these certificates directly impact 
individuals’ rights, there is a crucial need to consider the laws and regulations, including those 
on data privacy and human rights. 
Experts at the workshops and interviews have also highlighted that to avoid the exacerbation 
of existing biases and inequality in society, providers of Covid-19 health status certificates 
should consider the needs of all users and not only those with high levels of digital literacy. 
In this regard, paper-based certificates facilitate access to the credentials by all. 
Yet, the risk of fraud and the incentives to procure false Covid-19 health status certificates 
were also emphasised. Such risks may be more important concerning paper-based certificates. 
As a solution, experts have underlined the need for secure applications and embedded 
technologies such as QR codes.
Accordingly, these three main barriers to implementation – lack of trust, lack of global 
standards, and lack of a holistic approach – should be carefully considered by those 
implementing Covid-19 health status certificates in the public and private sector. Conversely, 
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Three sets of measures have the potential to contribute to the responsible 
implementation of Covid-19 certificates: (1) inclusion of sunset clauses in legislation;  
(2) appropriate governance of health data; and (3) proactive protection of data privacy.
Sunset clauses
A sunset clause is a provision that sets a time limit for legislation. That means that in principle, 
the rules provided for in a given legislative act will only be valid for a fixed period unless specific 
exceptions apply – for example, the extension of the statute by law after re-examination of the 
matter by Parliament. 
For instance, in the UK, a sunset clause was inserted in the Coronavirus legislation due to the 
unprecedented nature of the pandemic (Coronavirus Act 2020, ss 89-90). It sets out that the 
“Act expires at the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which it is passed” 
(Coronavirus Act 2020, s 89 (1)) – although a variety of exceptions apply (Coronavirus Act 2020, 
ss 89 (2) and 90). The Act is also reviewed by the Parliament every six months (Coronavirus 
Act 2020, s 98). The Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020 also provides a sunset clause according 
to which an expiry date is set – although that date can be extended (Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 
2020, s 12).
In the same way, legislators should include a specific sunset clause in the relevant legislation 
providing the legal basis for the deployment of Covid-19 health status certificates. Such a 
clause should specify an expiry date for the deployment of these certificates. As such, it is 
recommended that:
• Covid-19 health status certificates should be used only during the pandemic, and their use 
discontinued once the WHO declares that Covid-19 is no longer a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern (as per the 2005 International Health Regulations, Article 1 (1)). 
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Potential implementation enablers
• In addition, technical measures should be in place to ensure that such limitations are 
effective in practice. For example, technical measures can be adopted to enable automatic 
data deletion after a predefined timeframe within data transfer agreements (Stock & Orrell, 
2020). They can also be used to phase out smartphone Covid-19 health status certificates 
applications after the pandemic. 
The provision of a sunset clause coupled with these technical measures could contribute 
to building trust in the deployment of Covid-19 health status certificates. They would be 
used as emergency and exceptional tools, valid only during the pandemic, thus avoiding their 
normalisation beyond that timeframe. 
Accountability 
The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the need for better data governance concerning health 
data, particularly data collected and used in the context of Covid-19 health status certificates. 
Accountability is one of the fundamental principles of data governance (Ladley, 2019) and should 
be central to Covid-19 health status certificates due to the sensitivity of health data.  
Accountability mechanisms should be an integral part of the frameworks governing the 
deployment of Covid-19 certificates. 
In simple terms, accountability can be defined as calling someone to account for their actions 
or omissions (Mulgan, 2000). Therefore, accountability entails a process in which one person or 
entity gives account for an action or omission to another one. Through this process, it is possible 
to verify whether that person or entity may be legally responsible or liable for the consequences 
of their acts or omissions (Giesen & Kristen, 2014, p. 6). 
For instance, State responsibility is engaged when harmful conduct is attributable to a State 
and when it constitutes a breach of one of the State’s obligations under international law 
(International Law Commission, 2001; Marks & Azizi, 2010; McGregor, Murray, & Ng, 2019). 
State parties to international treaties on human rights owe treaty obligations to individuals who 
find themselves within those States’ jurisdiction – as per Article 2 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR); and Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). These States 
must, therefore, respect and protect individuals’ human rights set forth by these treaties (Human 
Rights Committee, 2004). 
Therefore, public authorities deploying or requiring Covid-19 health status certificates are 
responsible for the harms caused to individuals if their conduct breaches the applicable legal 
obligations to respect and protect human rights. 
Their responsibility does not depend on whether they have designed and developed Covid-19 
health status certificates internally. They are also responsible if they procure the certificates and 
the technologies enabling them to work from private sector suppliers. This is because States 
must adopt measures necessary to safeguard the effective respect of these rights even when 
harm originates in actions or omissions committed by private persons or entities (Human Rights 
Committee, 2004, paras. 6-8). 
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Proactive protection of data privacy
If effectively implemented, Covid-19 health status certificates may contribute to managing 
the effects of the current pandemic. Yet, as it will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section, Covid-19 health status certificates pose significant challenges to data privacy. 
Data protection impact assessments (DPIAs) should also be carried out, as per Article 35, 
paragraph 1 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), considering that the Covid-19 
health status certificates pose significant risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals. 
Moreover, due to the sensitivity of health data collected and used by Covid-19 health status 
certificates, providers should build data protection into the design of the certificates by default 
to address potential data privacy-invasive situations proactively, as required by Article 25, 
paragraph 1 of the GDPR. 
In any case, the urgency surrounding the adoption of these measures should not lead to 
governments rolling out Covid-19 health status certificates in haste without the appropriate 
protection of data privacy, as discussed below.
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Risks and mitigation strategies 
Covid-19 health status certificates pose essential questions for the protection of data 
privacy and human rights given that: (1) they use sensitive personal health information; 
(2) create a new distinction between individuals based on their health status, and
(3) can be used to determine the degree of freedoms and rights individuals may enjoy
(Beduschi, 2020b).
Therefore, it is important to analyse the risks and the potential risk mitigation 
strategies concerning data privacy and exclusion and discrimination.
Data privacy
Data protection is guaranteed in the EU by the GDPR. This regulation was implemented in the 
UK before Brexit through the adoption of the Data Protection Act 2018. Subsequently, the 
GDPR was retained in domestic law as the UK GDPR (Department for Digital, Culture, Media  
& Sport, 2020). 
According to Article 4, paragraph 15 of the GDPR, “data concerning health” means “personal 
data related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of health 
care services, which reveal information about his or her health status.” Covid-19 test results and 
vaccination records relate to a natural person’s physical health and reveal information about 
their health status – thus, they are considered health data under the GDPR.
As previously analysed in detail in the context of this research project (Beduschi, 2020b, 2021), 
health data such as Covid-19 test results and vaccination records enjoy a reinforced level of 
protection under Article 9 of the GDPR. 
In addition, it is a matter of well-established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
that the right to respect for private life (as provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR) includes the 
protection of personal information concerning one’s health and attributes such as biometric  
data and DNA samples (S. and Marper v. UK, 2008; Gaughram v. UK, 2020).  
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However, the protection afforded by Article 8 of the ECHR is not absolute. That means that this 
right may be restricted, as long as the restrictions are not arbitrary. Interferences with this right by 
public authorities may be justified under the following two broad conditions: 
1.  Any interference must safeguard at least one of the legitimate aims enumerated in the second 
paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR.  
 
These include, for example, “the protection of health” and “the economic well-being of the 
country,” which are of importance in the context of the current pandemic. 
2.  Any interference with this right must satisfy the cumulative tests of legality, necessity, and 
proportionality.
The legality test requires that public authorities’ measures interfering with this right have a legal basis 
in domestic law and be compatible with the rule of law (S. and Marper v. UK, 2008, para. 95; Malone 
v. UK, 1984, para. 67). Accordingly, domestic laws must provide suitable and specific measures to 
safeguard individuals’ rights and freedoms as required by Article 9, paragraph 2 under (i) of the 
GDPR – even when public health interests are at stake. In addition, to comply with the legality test 
under Article 8 of the ECHR, domestic laws must be adequately accessible and foreseeable and 
afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness (S. and Marper v. UK, 2008, para. 95). 
The necessity test demands that the measures adopted address a pressing social need (S. and Marper 
v. UK, 2008, para. 101). In the context of the current pandemic, if the adoption of Covid-19 health 
status certificates contributes to re-instating freedom of movement and lifting restrictive lockdowns, 
the measure may arguably satisfy the necessity test. 
The proportionality test requires that the measures taken by public authorities are proportionate to 
the legitimate aims pursued and entail the least restrictive viable solution (Kennedy v. UK, 2010, para. 
155; Roman Zakharov v. Russia, 2015, para. 260). The proportionality test would require that public 
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authorities strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests of the community as 
a whole and, on the other hand, private individuals’ rights. In doing so, public authorities often 
benefit from a certain leeway or margin of appreciation (Greer, 2000; Shany, 2005; Letsas, 
2006; McGoldrick, 2016; Follesdal, 2017). 
In this regard, the context of deployment of these certificates, their impact on rights and 
freedoms, and the extent of the safeguards put in place will determine whether public 
authorities have found an adequate balance between the competing rights and interests at 
stake (Beduschi, 2021, pp. 5-6). 
Accordingly, the following recommendations can be made: 
• First, it is crucial that Covid-19 health status certificate providers, whether from the private 
or public sector, abide by the basic data protection principles enumerated in Article 5 of 
the GDPR. These include the principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency, purpose 
limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality, and 
accountability.
• Second, providers should build data protection into the design of the Covid-19 health 
status certificates by default, as required by Article 25, paragraph 1 of the GDPR. That 
would contribute towards mitigating known risks to data privacy. For example, providers 
should limit the type of information requested and collected by default. They should also 
add safeguards concerning any transfer of personal data to third parties in the design of the 
Covid-19 health status certificates. 
• Third, as Covid-19 health status certificates concern health data, providers should maintain 
the confidentiality and security of the information collected and processed. They should 
prevent any unauthorised access, accidental loss, damage or destruction of the data, as per 
Article 5, paragraph 1 (f) of the GDPR. 
• Finally, policymakers should request that providers undertake data protection impact 
assessments (DPIAs) in line with the requirements of Article 35, paragraph 1 of the GDPR. 
Doing so is essential as Covid-19 health status certificates are likely to result in a high risk 
to natural persons’ rights and freedoms, in particular, due to exclusion and discrimination. 
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Exclusion and discrimination
All persons are equal in dignity and rights (Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR)) and are entitled to the equal protection of the law without any discrimination (Article 7 
UDHR; Article 26 of the ICCPR; Article 14 of the ECHR; Article 24 of the ACHR; Article 3 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)). 
Yet, Covid-19 health status certificates create a distinction between individuals based on their 
health status (Beduschi, 2020b). Depending on how they are implemented, Covid-19 health status 
certificates may lead to the exclusion of parts of the population based on their health status. That 
can be the case of those persons who do not have access to vaccines or cannot afford Covid-19 
tests (Beduschi, 2020b; Council of Europe, 2021; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2021). 
Minorities and vulnerable populations may be even more at risk of exclusion due to the pervasive 
social and health inequalities that have only been deepened during the pandemic (Ada Lovelace 
Institute, 2021c).
A critical issue relates to the risk of excluding populations who do not currently have ways to prove 
their identity. As Covid-19 health status certificates rely on verifying identity to allow individuals 
to prove their health status, those without documentary evidence of their identity may be left 
behind. For instance, in the UK, an estimate of 24% of adult citizens do not have a passport or a 
photographic ID document such as a drivers’ licence (Uberoi, 2019). 
As a result, Covid-19 health status certificates providers may turn to facial recognition technologies 
to verify the identity of those without identity documents (Ada Lovelace Institute, 2021d, pp. 71-72). 
That may impact Black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals more severely. Research demonstrates 
that facial recognition technologies are still not accurate for recognising Black and Asian faces and  
are significantly inaccurate when trying to recognise women with darker skin types (Buolamwini  
& Gebru, 2018). 
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Such technical problems could have devastating consequences for individuals using Covid-19 
certificates. They could also lead to unlawful discrimination based on race if there are no 
alternative ways to verify identity and if the providers insist on using inaccurate facial recognition 
technologies.
In addition, identity verification may deter migrants in an irregular situation from being vaccinated 
and thus increase the risks for public health if these populations are not vaccinated (UN 
Committee on Migrant Workers, 2021). 
Globally, while a consensus is being formed about requiring Covid-19 health status certificates 
for international travel (World Committee on Tourism Ethics, 2021), the lack of equitable access 
to vaccines by populations worldwide may reduce international mobility. The unvaccinated 
individuals in the Global South may find limited access to international travel and mobility. Such 
limitations can also be worsened by the differences in types of vaccines reaching Global South 
countries and those approved by and authorised in Global North countries. Similar concerns 
have been voiced about the type of vaccines administered in the UK as compared with those 
authorised for travel to the EU (Rankin, 2021).
The domestic uses of these certificates also pose considerable problems. In particular, requiring 
proof of Covid-19 vaccination for access to workplaces, restaurants, shops, and other private 
venues may lead to the exclusion of the unvaccinated population and risks creating a two-tiered 
society (Ada Lovelace Institute, 2021d; Beduschi, 2021; Taylor, Milan, Veale, & Gürses, 2021; 
Thomas, King, Fernandez-Bermejo, Bogg, & Veale, 2021; Wagner, 2021). 
In addition, if Covid-19 tests are not affordable to everyone, requiring Covid-19 health status 
certificates for travel and accessing public and private spaces risks reinforcing the inequality in 
society and creating a system in which only the wealthy have access to mobility and services. For 
instance, the costs of Covid-19 tests at airports worldwide vary significantly, with PCR test costs 
ranging from USD $8 to USD $404 and rapid antigen test costs between USD $2 and USD $214 
(Skytrax, 2021).
Accordingly, policymakers should ensure the availability and affordability of Covid-19 tests and 
vaccines to the whole population to avoid creating a two-tiered society in which only the wealthy 
have access to mobility and services.
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Recommendations
The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the need for policymakers to 
navigate a complex set of legal obligations while balancing competing 
individuals’ rights and public interests. 
This report has examined (1) the key barriers to the implementation of 
Covid-19 health status certificates, (2) the potential implementation enablers, 
and (3) the risks these certificates pose to the protection of data privacy and 
human rights as well as the potential avenues for risk mitigation. 
Analysis in this report confirms that while managing the effects of the 
pandemic, policymakers must strike an adequate balance between protecting 
the rights and freedoms of all individuals and safeguarding public interests. In 
doing so, policymakers should carefully consider the risks to these rights and 
freedoms and the available mitigation strategies.
Accordingly, it is recommended that:  
1.  Policymakers should ensure the availability and affordability of Covid-19 
tests and vaccines to the whole population to avoid creating a two-tiered 
society in which only the wealthy have access to mobility and services.
2.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificates are 
only used during the pandemic and that their use is discontinued once the 
WHO declares that Covid-19 is no longer a public health emergency of 
international concern. 
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3.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificate providers, 
whether from the private or public sector, abide by the basic data protection 
principles, including lawfulness, fairness and transparency, purpose limitation, 
data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality, 
and accountability.
4.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificate providers 
build data protection into the design of these certificates by default, thus 
contributing towards mitigating known risks to data privacy. 
5.  Policymakers should ensure that Covid-19 health status certificate providers 
maintain the confidentiality and security of the information collected and 
processed. They should prevent any unauthorised access, accidental loss, 
damage or destruction of the data. 
6.  Policymakers should request that Covid-19 health status certificate providers 
undertake data protection impact assessments (DPIA) before implementing 
specific solutions. That is important as these certificates are likely to result in 
a high risk to natural persons’ rights and freedoms.
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Annex 1. Interviews
We conducted twenty semi-structured interviews with technologists and experts 
in digital identity and certification between December 2020 and March 2021.  
The interview protocol including the questions and the list of interviewees are 
reproduced below.
Interview protocol
Covid-19: Human Rights Implications of Digital Certificates for Health Status Verification
Interview Protocol
This project is funded by the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) and Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) – grant number ES/V004980/1. It investigates the data privacy and 
human rights implications of digital certificates for health status verification, also referred to as 
digital health passports or immunity passports. 
As part of the study, we are interviewing digital identity and digital certification specialists from 
across the private and public sector to inform our analysis. Given your relevant expertise, you 
have been invited to take part in an interview with the project team, lasting approximately 
45 minutes.  
If at any point you feel you are unable to respond to any of the interview questions, simply 
inform the interviewer, and we will move onto subsequent questions. We understand that the 
backgrounds and experiences of our interviewees will vary considerably and are keen to focus 
on the areas where you feel able to provide commentary.
You have been provided with a Participant Information Sheet and a Consent Form. We would 
like to ask you to review these documents and please complete and sign the consent form. We 
will be taking notes during the interview, and – if selected in the consent form – we will record 
this interview solely to aid note-taking. Both the recording and the notes of the interview will be 
stored securely in line with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
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Interview questions 
• What is your current role and experience with digital identity and or digital health passports?
• How would you characterise the current landscape of using digital health passports in the 
country or countries where you work and more broadly?
• In your view, what are the main opportunities associated with digital health passports?
• In your view, what are the main risks or challenges associated with digital health passports, 
particularly concerning privacy, data protection and human rights in general?
• In your view, what are the main barriers or challenges for wider adoption of digital health 
passports in the country or countries where you work and more broadly?
• What is the nature of these barriers or challenges?
• Do these barriers or challenges concern specific technical capabilities, or are they more 
general? 
• In your view, what should be the requirements in relation to ethics and the legal and regulatory 
environment to enable further adoption of digital health passports?
• In your view, what should be the priorities for governments and the industry to address these 
requirements? 
Conclusion
• Do you have any further comments or observations?
• Do you have recommendations of other experts for us to speak to in the context of this study?
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Interviewees
INT 01 Adrian Gropper CTO, Patient Privacy Rights Foundation
INT 02 Andres Kütt Proud Engineers
INT 03 Cristina Apostol Global PAM Lead, Visa
INT 04 Elizabeth Renieris Founder, hackylawyer Affiliate, Berkman Klein Center 
for Internet & Society, Harvard University Tech + 
Human Rights Fellow, Carr Center for Human Rights 
Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
INT 05 Francesca Hobson Content Marketing Manager at Ubisecure
INT 06 Anonymous eHealth expert, MyData Sweden
INT 07 Jessica Patel CCO at Airside
INT 08 Joss Langford Director, Coelition
INT 09 Anonymous Anonymous (Digital Identity Industry)
INT 10 Karyn Bright Head of Communications, Women in Identity
INT 11 Anonymous Anonymous (Government)
INT 12 Anonymous Anonymous (Digital Identity Industry)
INT 13 Michael Shea Director, Identity Science Practice
INT 14 Paul Knowles Head of the Advisory Council | Human Colossus 
Foundation
INT 15 Anonymous Yoti
INT 16 Marten Kaevats National Digital Advisor, Government of Estonia
INT 17 Heather Kendall CEO, Web42
INT 18 Anonymous London School of Economics
INT 19 Emrys Schoemaker Research Director, Caribou Digital  
INT 20 Debajani Mohanty DID/SSI Expert, MyEarth.Id
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Annex 2. Workshops
WP 01 Dia Banerji Expert, Women in Identity; Business Consultant, Blockchain Blockpass 
Identity Lab, Edinburgh Napier University
WP 02 David Barrett Lecturer, University of Exeter
WP 03 Karyn Bright Head of Communications, Women in Identity
WP 04 Lilian Edwards Professor of Law, Innovation & Society, Newcastle University 
WP 05 Swati Gola Lecturer, University of Exeter
WP 06 Naomi Hawkins Associate Professor, University of Exeter
WP 07 Jo Hollings Expert, Women in Identity
WP 08 Timon Hughes-Davies Senior Lecturer, University of Exeter
WP 09 Elinor Hull Digital Identity Lead, Post Office
WP 10 Joasia Luzak Associate Professor, University of Exeter
WP 11 Louise Maynard-Atem Data Insights Lead, GBG Plc and Women in Identity
WP 12 Sarah Munro Director of Personal Identity, Onfido and Women in Identity
WP 12 Irene Pietropaoli Research Leader in Business & Human Rights, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law
WP 13 Cheryl Stevens Expert, Women in Identity
WP 14 Adam Wagner Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers
Workshop participants
The first project workshop was co-organised with Women in Identity and focused on exploring the key 
opportunities and challenges concerning designing and deploying digital health certificates. The purpose of  
the second project workshop was to discuss the different legal and ethical implications of such certificates. 
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Disclaimer and copyright
Research for this report was conducted by Dr Ana Beduschi, Associate Professor of Law at the University 
of Exeter Law School. It presents independent research funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) as part of UK Research & Innovation (UKRI)’s rapid response to Covid-19 (project title 
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